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ABSTRACT
To attract investments in mineral extraction, physical infrastructure
and agricultural commercialization over a vast swathe of Northern
Kenya, national politicians and bureaucrats are casting the area as
being both abundant with land and resources, and as, conversely,
‘backward’, ‘unexploited’ and ‘empty’. Drawing on evidence from
Lamu County, and focusing on the planned Lamu Port and South
Sudan Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) corridor, this article contends
that such high-modernist and ‘new frontier’ discourses are usually
complicated by the realities on the ground. Based on common
perceptions about land and ethnicity, and how these are
intertwined with the politics of belonging and redistribution,
these realities exemplify complex economies of anticipation –
through which networks of patronage, alliance, and mobilization
are being created or entrenched in advance of major investments.
This article argues that it is these anticipations – more than oﬃcial
designs – that will determine the future direction of LAPSSET,
especially in respect to who will get what, when and how, within
its promised prosperous future.
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On 1 May 2018, a three-judge bench sitting in the coastal town of Malindi, Kenya, ordered
the Kenyan government to pay $170 million as compensation for a group of about 4,600
ﬁshermen displaced from Manda bay in Lamu County, the site of an on-going construc-
tion of a modern deep-water port.1 While the Kenya Ports Authority, which is in charge of
the port construction, successfully appealed the judgement a few months later, the verdict,
which addressed serious issues of concern to a section of the public in Lamu, had noted
that the ﬁshermen were not opposed to the new port primarily, but rather the manner
in which the wider Lamu Port and South Sudan Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) corridor
– in which the port forms an integral part – was conceptualized and implemented.2 In this
way, and in following a common trend of local responses in other areas along the proposed
corridor, the ﬁshermen’s case was not one of resistance to the project per se, but of attempt-
ing to ensure a greater share of LAPSSET’s activities, or to direct the project in particular
ways that will include local interests, public and private.3 In Kenya, this can be considered
the result of wider ramiﬁcations of a public language of rights and legal institutions, which
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was given prominence by a constitution promulgated in 2010.4 Yet, at another level, the
case exempliﬁed the extent to which global discourses regarding environmental conserva-
tion, and a related but growing obsession with ‘indigenous knowledge,’ can be deployed by
local groups to improve the terms of inclusion within the imagined future of LAPSSET.5 In
sum, this was one example in which the present in Lamu has in recent times been con-
stantly shaped by and remade around LAPSSET’s promised future.
Lamu county – whose Amu island, the largest of the county’s 65 islands, was listed as a
UNESCO world heritage site in 2001 – is a key node in the proposed LAPSSET corridor.
Several LAPSSET infrastructure components come together in the county (Figure 1): a
newmodern port of 32 berths, and a planned network of new transport infrastructure con-
sisting of an airport, a series of highways, a standard-gauge railway and an oil pipeline.6
There are also plans to construct an oil reﬁnery, a Special Economic Zone, a ‘Growth
Area’ and a new metropolis city with the capacity to accommodate approximately 1.1
million people, up from the 2009 recorded population of 112,252 people.7 This population
growth, it is expected, will be driven by opportunities for industrial, logistics, tourism
development. LAPSSET planners also hope to leverage these infrastructural developments
to boost investments in short and long-term agricultural value chains for agricultural pro-
ducts that are suited to the climatic and geological conditions of Lamu and other parts of
the LAPSSET corridor.8 To support these developments, plans are also underway to create
Figure 1. LAPSSET in Lamu.
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new sources of energy – through a coal-ﬁred electricity generating plant and wind-power
farm – and an adequate infrastructure for the supply of water.
Broadly, these projects reﬂect the high-modernist impulses of their promoters (national
politicians and bureaucrats), some of whom genuinely expect that their plans to transform
Lamu and Northern Kenya will attract the capital required to create a new modernizing
force in the region. As a result, and in a manner similar to Ethiopia’s post-imperial state-
craft in its pastoral lowlands, LAPSSET’s framing of Northern Kenya and Lamu as empty
(of civilized people and modernity), but full (of resources, especially land and minerals),
appears to be legitimating the appropriation of ‘underutilized’ land, while ‘casting the state
and its elites as heroes who will make these regions anew.’9 Despite the rhetoric, these dis-
cursive frameworks – which are accompanied by seductive images of the future of Lamu
under LAPSSET that exist mostly on paper – are generating anticipations on the ground,
whereby LAPSSET’s future direction is currently being negotiated and renegotiated by a
diverse set of actors, through diﬀerent local processes.10
Following from this context, this article shows how such economies of ‘knowing about’,
‘imagining’ and ‘living towards’ the future, are underpinning the contemporary political
economy of Lamu, shaping relationships of power and consent at diﬀerent levels.11 By
adopting a localized framework within an empirical tradition,12 the article examines
how LAPSSET is made, sustained and disrupted in this economy of anticipation. Speciﬁ-
cally, the article examines the ways in which LAPSSET is shaping and is being shaped by
contested meanings of land and belonging, and associated concerns over the fate of diverse
livelihoods, as individuals struggle to secure a place in the anticipated modernized and
prosperous future of Lamu.
Building on recent work within critical agrarian studies – especially on the impact of
land-based investments in the ‘Global South’ – the concept of anticipation underscores
the complex nature of responses ‘from below’, beyond dispossession, domination or resist-
ance, that arise when capital (and the state) are extended into rural and marginal areas. In
this literature, the idea that land deals (or large infrastructure projects) usually expel (or
promise to expel) local communities from their land, and that those local communities
usually engage in resistance, has been put into question.13 This is because, ‘when such
deals hit the ground, they interact with social groups within the state and in society
that are diﬀerentiated along lines of class, gender, generation, ethnicity and nationality,
and that have historically speciﬁc expectations, aspirations and traditions of struggle.’14
It is these dynamics that produce diverse responses involving a diverse set of actors,
with diﬀerent consequences.
In Lamu, renewed meanings of land as property, driven by the anticipations of
LAPSSET, are conﬂicting with meanings of land as a cultural resource, or as ethnic terri-
tory. The latter constitutes a widespread ideology in Kenya, where land is inexorably
linked with ethnic identity, ideas of belonging are informed by ethnicity, and land and eth-
nicity have both inﬂuenced the politics of redistribution.15 Conﬂicting meanings of land,
identity and belonging are also projected through ideas of vulnerability and marginality,
which have not only been deployed to make moral and legal claims in the context of
increasing competition for land and resources, but are giving prominence to exclusivist
notions of belonging and citizenship – where commonplace terms such as wageni
(‘guests’ or ‘migrant’ communities) and wenyeji (‘hosts’ or ‘indigenous’ communities),
are being cast in new light, as individuals and groups anticipate LAPSSET’s future.16 As
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this happens, LAPSSET is also intersecting with pre-existing territorial restructuring pro-
cesses, especially increased sedentarization and intensiﬁcation of land use, and other
claims of community-based land ownership, such as the establishment of ranches and
conservancies, that constitute locally-driven mechanisms of claim making on land and
resources. It is through such processes that various actors in Lamu are remaking and
shaping the present around a diverse and changing future, creating new or entrenching
old networks of patronage, alliance, and mobilization in the process. These anticipations,
the article submits, will crucially determine the nature of the distribution of economic,
agricultural and other resources within the LAPSSET corridor, and who will be included
or excluded from its promised prosperous future.
Despite their signiﬁcance in determining the direction of large-scale development,
economies of anticipation do not usually feature in inﬂuential analyses of development
in rural and marginal areas, most of which have emphasized dispossession of rural com-
munities, state domination (or the expansion of bureaucratic power) and local resist-
ance as the main outcomes.17 The latter has been useful, especially in explaining the
politics of development in ‘authoritarian’ contexts where an epistemic rift exists
between the cultural repertoires of the bearers of capital and/or state elites, and
those of local communities.18 The complexity (of bureaucratic and private investment
outcomes in marginal areas) resonates with ﬁndings of studies that have examined
how the state (and capital) actually works on the ground (especially in democratizing
and decentralizing contexts) – suggesting that the operation of multiple interests,
actors, and factions usually work to reduce the predictability of political processes at
the local level.19 In this way, and through multiple networks of loyalty and patronage,
numerous opportunities are created, mostly for local elites, but sometimes for ‘poor
farmers’, ‘rural women’, and ‘pastoralists’ as well – or those tendentiously presented
in both academic and popular literature as hapless ‘victims,’ or determined ‘resisters’
of the state and capital.20
In Kenya, local government, and political devolution since 2013, has oﬀered the main
theatre around which these politics vividly intersect.21 Studies on the consequences of
Kenya’s devolved system of government indicate that it has not only fuelled the informa-
lization of the local state, but has also created multiple opportunities for a diverse range of
actors.22 It is under this context, of the local disruption of the logics of capital and the
bureaucratic rationality of the state, that LAPSSET has been debated, anticipated and
negotiated by multiple actors with diverse interests, producing complex and varied
outcomes.
The empirical foundation of the article consists of 40 qualitative interviews, conducted
in January, March, and August of 2018 with Lamu residents: farmers, businessmen, acti-
vists, ﬁshermen, local politicians, managers of ranches and conservancies, and women and
youth leaders. Other interviews, especially with LAPSSET project managers and other gov-
ernment oﬃcials, were conducted in the urban centres of Mombasa and Nairobi. This
ﬁeldwork material was triangulated with a synthesis of government, media, and non-gov-
ernmental reports.
The article proceeds as follows: the ﬁrst section is a historical proﬁle of Lamu, with a
view of discussing how recent politics have been shaped by longer processes of migration
and land-use change since the early decades of the twentieth century. This section is fol-
lowed by three others, each examining the renewed meanings of land; of culture and the
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fate of diverse livelihoods; and of belonging in the context of the anticipations generated by
LAPSSET. The article ends with a few concluding remarks.
Lamu: a history of marginalization, settlement and incorporation
Lamu was a thriving religious centre and port city during the nineteenth century, based on
trade and slave-run plantation agriculture, with links to a wider Omani-led Indian Ocean
trading network.23 As such, the imposition of colonial rule, and the subsequent abolish-
ment of slavery in 1907, greatly undermined Lamu’s political and economic inﬂuence,
both within the Western Indian Ocean, and within the new colony that shifted the base
of power from the coast to Kenya’s central highlands.24 As a result, the parts of Lamu’s
mainland area (Figures 2 and 3), where slave-run plantations had been established,
Figure 2. Map of Kenya indicating Lamu county.
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were largely abandoned, and most of the land turned into forest.25 It was not until the late
1960s that Kenya’s post-colonial administration initiated plans to establish commercial
agricultural enterprises (and later settlements) on the mainland areas, and some parts
of the archipelago.
In 1971, the government established a cotton plantation on 1,000 acres of land on the
mainland areas near Lake Kenyatta (named after Kenya’s ﬁrst president when he visited
the area to open the plantation) but these eﬀorts were complicated by a general lack of
labour.26 Through a combination of government inertia and lack of political will to
transform the area (unlike recent eﬀorts being projected through LAPSSET) multiple
attempts to recruit labourers failed, and as a result, the government decided to
abolish the plantation altogether, creating a settlement scheme of 10.3-acre plots
instead.27 Interviews with residents of the settlement scheme suggest that its establish-
ment was motivated by the need to create a solution to the land problem in Central
Kenya.28 In this way, while the ﬁrst to be settled were the local workers of the
defunct Cotton Lint and Seed-Marketing board that had been running the plantation,
including some local Bajuni, Sanye, Boni and Giriama, the majority of the settlement
scheme’s current residents – Kikuyus with origins from Kenya’s central highlands –
arrived between 1973 and 1975, taking up residence in what would be called the
Lake Kenyatta Settlement Scheme.29
A town called Mpeketoni grew out of the settlement scheme. But, initially, ‘it was
like a village in a forest. It was not a town until 1986, when GTZ [German Technical
Cooperation Agency] came, and did the town planning, and the roads, and brought
water, that farming begun to thrive.’30 As a result of this, Mpeketoni’s population
grew rapidly during the 1990s, quickly surpassing that of smaller villages around it.
From 1997, the success of the Lake Kenyatta settlement scheme at Mpeketoni saw
the establishment of three more schemes on the mainland, and four on the
Figure 3. Map of Lamu.
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islands.31 In these settlement schemes, a trend with later consequences on local politics
was established, whereby a majority of the beneﬁciaries of the schemes on the islands
were Bajuni, and their counterparts on the mainland were Kikuyu. Interviews with
both Kikuyu and Bajuni residents suggest that on the mainland areas, requests by
the local Bajuni for plot allocation were also granted, especially since the 1990s.32
However, non-Bajuni opinion suggests that the Bajuni beneﬁciaries did not cultivate,
or occupy the land.
They did not go there, they have title deeds, but they did not go… they sold the plots, others
they just left as forests until today… . they didn’t go there… it’s like they were given air that
they did not even see.33
Such opinion, central in local narratives regarding the virtues of work and cultivation,
emerges out of wider moral discourses by cultivator groups such as the Kikuyu that are
often deployed to negotiate belonging in a country of recent migration, and where ethni-
city and land are inextricably linked.34 This is signiﬁcant for Lamu, where wider territorial
restructuring processes witnessed elsewhere in Northern Kenya, such as increased seden-
tarization and intensiﬁcation of land use, driven especially by the spread of rain-fed agri-
culture, and other claims of community-based land ownership (such as the establishment
of ranches and conservancies), have vividly intersected, intensifying competition over land
and resources.35
While the Kikuyu constitute the bulk of Lamu’s mainland population since the 1970s, it
is important to note that they have been joined (especially since the early 2000s) by smaller
numbers of communities from other parts of Kenya.36 Through cultivation and settle-
ment, and despite lacking formal title to their plots, these recent inhabitants of Lamu
have ‘opened-up’ parts of the mainland that have remained largely uninhabited since
the early 1900s. This recent pattern of migration has not only led to increasing disagree-
ments over land ownership, boundaries and access to valuable land-based resources, but it
is also reshaping the meaning of land and belonging.37
The result is a growing prominence of autochthonous discourses in local political
debates, where ideas of ethnic territoriality, common in other parts of Kenya, are engen-
dering an understating of ethnic others as ‘immigrants’ and ‘guests’. In such contexts,
driven by common perceptions of how ethnicity, land and redistribution are intertwined
in Kenya, commonplace terms such as wageni (guests) and wenyeji (hosts), are gaining
wide currency, as political, social and economic processes generate uncertainty, and com-
petition for resources between ‘guests’ and ‘hosts’ intensiﬁes.38 These processes of accumu-
lation, sedentarization and claims making, have been ampliﬁed by the anticipation of
LAPSSET, as was noted by the ﬁrst Lamu County Integrated Development Plan (CIDP)
for the period 2013–17, which states, ‘challenges facing Lamu is population growth
owing to migration into Lamu from other parts of the country, fuelled partly by the antici-
pated opportunities accruing from the Lamu Port South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport
(LAPSSET) Corridor.’39
In Lamu, these ‘challenges’ have occasioned widespread demands for the formaliza-
tion of land claims, for monetary compensation of land (and sea) that is earmarked for
LAPSSET projects, and for the protection and preservation of diverse cultures and live-
lihoods – all of which are negotiated through reimagined ideas of belonging and citizen-
ship, related especially, to questions of who gets what, where, when and how.40 Such
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questions, as will be shown below, do not only promise to determine the future distri-
bution of economic, agricultural and other resources in Lamu and elsewhere within the
LAPSSET corridor, but also who will be included or excluded from LAPSSET’s prom-
ised prosperous future.
Making property and claiming land
The oﬃcial launch of LAPSSET on 2 March 2012 at a village called Kililana in Lamu was
accompanied by widespread concerns and fears regarding the fate of land in Lamu. This
was informed by wide circulating rumours of a ‘land grab’ in neighbouring Tana-River,
where proposals by a plethora of international companies to establish sugarcane planta-
tions and oil seed crops were accentuating pre-existing communal tensions over land-
use change, leading to inter-communal conﬂict in 2012, where more than 160 lives
were lost.41 One of the companies mentioned in the slated land acquisitions in Tana-
River, Mat International, had recently acquired 3,200 acres of land for sugarcane
growing in Lamu.42 Local protests ensued, and the allocation was revoked, after which
the land was handed over to the defunct Lamu county council for reallocation for
public uses.
It was at this time that the scope of the LAPSSET agenda in Lamu was becoming clearer,
and again, media reports were awash with rumours of a ‘Lamu land grab’, where people,
acutely aware of the possibilities for wealth creation through land ownership in Kenya,
wanted to own a piece of the modernized port-city of the future.43 As a result, Lamu was
reframed in national and local discursive frameworks as a county of anticipated economic
potential. Enclosures and informal demarcations emerged in cleared and forested areas, and
advertisements of ‘plots for sale’ – some of which were sent to this author in 2012 – were
widely shared and circulated through text messages and social media platforms.44
Revolving around the defunct Lamu county council, these anticipations created mul-
tiple networks cutting across familiar fault-lines of class, ethnicity, gender, religion and
race: as petty land-brokers, bureaucrats, local farmers, traders, politicians, international
investors, etc., all came together to create an economy of land speculation that was
steeped into the promise of a lucrative future in Lamu.45 However, it was not until
June-July 2014, when gunmen linked to Somalia-based Al-Shabaab attacked Mpeketoni
town and its environs, and killed close to ninety people, that the full extent of this
economy of land speculation in Lamu would be publically revealed.46 The president,
Uhuru Kenyatta – made to believe that land speculative practices, and wider claims of
a ‘Lamu land grab’ had motivated the attacks – revoked formal titles that were allegedly
issued to a total of 22 companies between 2011 and 2012.47 These titles, an audit by the
Ministry of Lands claimed, covered 500,000 acres of land, or 70% of all land in Lamu that
was available for settlement.48 Some of it included land on which 12 of the proposed 32
berths of the new port would be built. In a presentation that she made during a meeting
at State House, Nairobi – between the President and a delegation of political and reli-
gious leaders from Lamu – the then Minister for Lands, Ms. Charity Ngilu, stated that
‘in the [yet to be built] special economic zone, they were 18 parcels of land, each 500
acres, that were in the process of being issued to private companies, but we [were]
able to inﬁltrate the process and stop it.’49 Further investigations by the National
Land Commission (NLC), the commission tasked with allocations of public land,
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recommended the retention of only one title deed, regularizing six, and reverting the rest
back to the government.50
While the politics surrounding the revocation of titles (and the investigations that fol-
lowed) revealed who was involved in land speculation in Lamu – matters that were
perhaps already well known to the county’s residents – they also signiﬁed the changing
meaning of land as property. One farmer stated:
People did not know the true value of title deeds…we were just following the traditions of
dini [religion: Islam]. People just knew that you can’t grab land from your neighbour. People
knew the boundaries, which were marked by trees… […] If these trees fell, the elders would
just come and measure the boundaries with footsteps.51
Other residents claimed that local demands for the privatization and formal allocation of
land and plots begun with increased migration and settlement in Lamu since the 1990s,
but it was not until the announcement of LAPSSET in 2009 that the desire by people to
formally own individual plots took a radical turn. A local resident explained:
There are people who came and bought the land and they don’t live here. Maybe there are in
South Africa, they are in Nairobi. So, we went there, [to an area in the planned port city] after
they [state oﬃcials] came, and we adjudicated the land and allocated it to ourselves…
because it is ours and we don’t have land and we are the residents here. We surveyed the
place ourselves and the [Lamu county] governor promised that he will issue us with title
deeds.52
Combined with ubiquitous calls and expectations of monetary compensation for occupied
public land that is earmarked for LAPSSET activities, such demands (especially by people
who saw themselves as ‘indigenous’ to Lamu, such as the Bajuni, Boni and Sanye) were
also couched in exclusivist discourses about ‘knowing’ and ‘belonging’ to the soil.53 In a
country where identity and land are inexorably linked, these claims to ‘belong’ as auto-
chthonous ‘sons of the soil’ were more often than not, synonymous with narratives of
ethnic territorial exclusion.54 In Lamu, as elsewhere in Kenya, such narratives were pro-
viding the dominant language for debating belonging and citizenship. In such a place,
of recent migration and settlement, these debates were also becoming more public and
bitter, as people sought to secure land (and other land-based resources) in the context
of LAPSSET’s promised future. Recently settled residents of Lamu are claiming land
(and therefore political rights), not through autochthony, as most have ‘come’ from else-
where in Kenya, but through other managerial arguments, ‘to have improved the land, to
have brought civilisation, and sometimes, to simply have been born and raised there’,55 as
was stated by a resident of the Lake Kenyatta settlement scheme:
I have nowhere to go and call my own except for Lamu… I was born here… I went to school
here, I was raised here, I got married here, my children were born here, my parents are still
here…what concerns me are the claims by some people that we are guests… I wonder how
many years one needs to live in a place until people can accept that [they] too belong.56
Negotiations of claims to land and territory through exclusivist discourses of belonging
notwithstanding, these struggles around land in Lamu have also led to what Borras and
Franco have referred to as ‘broad types of political conﬂicts’ within and between the
state and social forces.57 In Lamu, this has been fuelled especially by conﬂicting interests
and aspirations within and between social groups and government departments, regarding
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especially the establishment of conservancies since the mid-2000s. Mosley and Watson
contend that in Lamu and elsewhere along the proposed LAPSSET corridor, conservancies
have been formed in opposition to, and in anticipation of the perceived threats and oppor-
tunities represented by LAPSSET.58 For instance, majority of the allocations of public land
that were revoked by President Uhuru Kenyatta in August 2014 had been issued to
ranches, some of which, through the help of global networks of funding, had been
turned into community conservancies. The introduction of these new forms of territori-
ality and land-use change, where ‘we are bringing new ideas of conservation to the com-
munity… encouraging them to conserve, rather than hunt the animals,’59 have
engendered new forms of conﬂict, between and within ethnic communities and govern-
ment departments, especially forestry, police and lands oﬃcials: as movement across con-
servancy borders is hampered, and as contentiously deﬁned ‘local communities’ become
more closely linked to bounded areas.60
In this way, discourses of ‘knowing’ and ‘belonging’ to land are not only underpinning
notions of belonging, but are also deployed in the establishment of conservancies, which
are presented by their promoters as mobilizations of ‘indigenous’ knowledge for the pur-
poses of better management of land and natural resources.61 By tapping into globalized
channels of funding – where an obsession with ‘indigeneity’ currently exists – conservan-
cies controlling vast amounts of territory are providing local actors (who have been
excluded in national political structures, but are excluding others from local territory
and natural resources) the means to push back against LAPSSET, with demands for
more local inﬂuence and control.62 A good example are the leaders of the Amu Ranch con-
servancy, which sits on 63,000 acres of land on the mainland, and is managed with the help
of the David Sheldrick Wildlife Trust.63 Despite the Trust’s claims, that it has ‘empowered
local communities in securing their future by protecting their biological diversity, safe-
guarding their culture and traditions and sustainably managing their natural resources
on land and sea’,64 local opinion suggests that the conservancy is not far from contestation.
A resident of Pangani, a village next to the ranch, stated:
The conservancy ranch, they claim that this is their area… they have invaded our land…
they have really bothered us… they have sent the police to beat us, they have taken our
farming implements, my uncle has been arrested a number of times… […] Yet we received
letters from the lands oﬃce allowing us to live here… how come today they have a ranch,
where did these ranches come from, why are there ranches everywhere, where will we live?65
The next section examines how narratives of territorialized identity, that have been used to
strengthen moral and legal claims to land and resources through wide ranging strategies –
from autochthony to the establishment of conservancies – are intersecting with ideas of
historical marginalization, and ecological and livelihood vulnerability. In particular, the
section examines how these discourses of ‘indigeneity’ are creating new domains of
action and inﬂuence, and are cultivating new channels of patronage, all driven by antici-
pations of LAPSSET’s future, and which promise to determine who will beneﬁt in that
future.
Anticipating future livelihoods
A week before the LAPSSET ground-breaking ceremony, which was held on 2 March 2012
at Kililana in Lamu, a letter was addressed to the then President of Kenya, Mwai Kibaki,
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that was signed by 1,000 people claiming to represent local community-based organiz-
ations, jointly calling themselves the ‘Save Lamu’ coalition. Listing concerns over commu-
nal safeguards, community consultation, environmental protection, and the fate of
customary natural resource management, the letter’s authors emphasized that they were
not opposed to LAPSSET, but asked that the government shares all information regarding
the corridor.66 Speciﬁcally, the authors of the letter demanded a comprehensive environ-
mental and social impact assessment, and the involvement of ‘local communities’ in the
planning and implementation of LAPSSET.67 By using the new constitutional dispensa-
tion – which after 2010, had energized a public language of accountability, public partici-
pation and livelihood protection – and taking advantage of a regime that was keen on
placating its neighbours, especially newly-independent South Sudan (whose vast oil
reserves had provided the main impetus for LAPSSET at the time); the residents of
Lamu were seizing the moment of the highly publicized ground-breaking ceremony so
as to seek concessions (and reassurances) from the government.68
The idea of a coalition of local CBOs (the ‘Save Lamu’ coalition was registered in 2011)
had been in existence since 2009, after some leaders associated with the Amu Ranch Con-
servancy met oﬃcials of the South African NGO, Natural Justice, with the express purpose
of developing a ‘bio-cultural community protocol’, or BCP.69 Many deﬁnitions exist, all of
which suggest that a BCP is a non-legally binding instrument prepared by ‘indigenous’
communities that codiﬁes their management of and interaction with their environment,
and is usually used to ensure that external actors (government, researchers, NGOs)
respect customary laws, values and decision-making processes, particularly those concern-
ing the stewardship of ‘indigenous’ territories and areas.70 While BCP’s have emerged as a
response to the global ecological crisis, two features in Lamu have lent such discourses pro-
minence: its long history of settlement (especially on the archipelago), combined with
years of government neglect that have left people dependent on traditional knowledge
systems when it comes to environmental management and livelihood adaptation. In par-
ticular, Lamu’s status as a UNESCO world-heritage site has given such concerns primacy
and a sense of urgency.
In the context of LAPSSET, the mission of ‘Save Lamu’ also constitutes part of locally-
driven mechanisms for provision of alternatives (or push-backs) against the scientiﬁc
ordering of nature and society that is embedded within LAPSSET’s high-modernist
visions. For instance, local actors associated with ‘Save Lamu’ have deployed multidimen-
sional traditional knowledge systems that they claim have been transmitted culturally
through generations over centuries; that provide a better understanding of local and inter-
connected patterns and processes over large spatial and temporal scales; such as insights
into the eﬀects on mangrove harvesting; cycles of resource availability within forests; and
shifts in climate or ecosystem structure and function.71 This traditional ecological knowl-
edge over space and resources has been deployed against speciﬁc components of the
LAPSSET project (for example, on levels of turbidity caused by dredging at the port
site), but most commonly, these have been tied to wider demands for comprehensive
environmental and social impact assessments over the entire spectrum of nature and live-
lihoods that will be aﬀected by LAPSSET.72
The fear, especially amongst a section of the predominantly Muslim Bajuni, is that the
modernizing forces within LAPSSET’s imagined future may work to wipe out, not only
Lamu’s ecological diversity, but the livelihoods of its ‘indigenous’ populations. This is
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informed by years of minimal access to technology, agricultural commercialization and
formal education: as ‘it is people from elsewhere [with formal education, skills and there-
fore inﬂuence], not us the locals, that will be employed at the port and the other companies
that will come.’73 A rather remarkable comment was the suggestion that ‘before the
LAPSSET projects begin, photographs [depicting] the way we live now should be taken
and curated in a museum so as to enable future generations to see how we used to live
before LAPSSET.’74 In this manner, deployments of ‘indigenous’ knowledge and alterna-
tive visions are associated with claims of historical exclusion, and therefore potential mar-
ginalization by a Nairobi-led process.
Similar to other parts of the Kenyan coast, where a litany of historical grievances has
animated local politics since the decolonization era, Lamu residents have complained
about low public investment in education and physical infrastructure, lack of requisite
government support in traditional farming, ﬁshing, mangrove harvesting and tourism,
including common perceptions (especially amongst the predominantly Muslim Bajuni)
of being treated as outsiders within Kenya’s formal system.75 Perhaps, as a result, Lamu
registers lower numbers compared to national averages of people who have attained sec-
ondary education and above, despite its favourable listing at number 6 out of 47 counties
in recent poverty estimates (See Table 1). In terms of the quality of education, Lamu has
been ranked 30th and 35th out of 47 counties for primary and secondary education
respectively.76 In addition, the local distribution of schools suggest that they are concen-
trated on the mainland areas where they are fewer Muslim Bajuni, such that the high lit-
eracy level rate of 70% is thought to mainly represent, ‘the highly “exposed” residents of
Lamu West [predominantly mainland] sub-county.’77
Following from this precedent, discourses of indigeneity and associated expectations by
a majority of the Bajuni (or those who see themselves as ‘indigenous’ to Lamu) – that they
should be allocated primacy in resource distribution – are not examples of resistance to
LAPSSET, but are part of the local strategies for reassurances against future exclusion.
In this context, asked if he was opposed to LAPSSET, a Bajuni resident on the mainland
areas said, ‘we want the port, but we don’t want it to be like Mombasa port, where the
locals [Bajuni] are engaged in odd-jobs, while outsiders sit in the oﬃces.’78 It was this
concern that informed the decision by local Bajuni leaders to request that the government
provides scholarships to students from Lamu (training them in various courses relevant
for port and related operations) in anticipation of the future employment opportunities
that will be generated by LAPSSET.79
Table 1. Poverty estimates and percentage distribution of population aged 3 years and above by
Highest Level of education reached.
County
Poverty estimates – Headcount rate
(%)
Secondary
(%)
College (Middle Level)
(%)
University
(%)
Lamu 28.5 15.1 2.6 1.2
Nairobi 16.7 31.0 14.2 9.5
Meru 19.4 17.8 4.6 2.0
Nyeri 19.3 28.7 6.7 2.9
Kirinyaga 20 26.7 4.5 1.8
Narok 22.6 14.9 4.0 2.1
National 36.1 22.4 5.7 3.2
Note: Open access data provided by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey,
March 2018.
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For other groups, especially farmers residing on the mainland areas, bio-cultural com-
munity protocols are unnecessary aberrations on the path to development and agricultural
commercialization, ‘it’s like the people of Lamu want Lamu to forever become a museum,’
one resident argued.80 Here again, one sees contending communal visions about progress
and civilization at work, pitying the recently settled residents of the mainland areas versus
the Bajuni who dominate the islands. However, opinion regarding the future of LAPSSET
is not unanimous even on the mainland areas, as for people without formalized individual
ownership of land, LAPSSET may bring beneﬁts but as discussed above, will also create
risks of ‘land-grabbing’, limiting people’s livelihood options.81
Such diverse anticipations are based upon a composite of present socio-economic chal-
lenges: diﬃculty in accessing credit, inputs and markets for farmers’ produce due to lack of
formal out-grower arrangements, and increasing farmer-herder conﬂicts over water and
land-based resources, amongst others.82 Most signiﬁcant to point out, however, is that
the negotiation and articulation of such concerns is intersecting with local politics, especially
questions regarding who belongs to Lamu, and therefore, holds primacy over the rights and
beneﬁts of its anticipated prosperous future under LAPSSET. The next section examines
how such questions are inﬂuencing local patterns of political mobilization.
The politics of belonging in a high-modernist future
Politics in Lamu took an interesting turn in 2013, with the coming into power of the ﬁrst
county government, consisting of its own executive and legislative arm (county assembly).
Before 2013, local politics, and related access to rights and local resources, had revolved
around the defunct (and poorly funded) Lamu county council, including a number of indi-
viduals who were associated with ruling parties based in Nairobi. One of them, a promi-
nent Arab businessman called Tahir Sheikh Said (commonly known as T.S.S.), who was
also the Lamu branch chairman of the former ruling party (the Kenya African National
Union, or KANU) between 1992 and 2002, funded the campaigns of politicians who
went on to parliament to represent Lamu’s two constituencies, Lamu West and Lamu
East.83 Fahim Twaha, who represented Lamu West from 1997 to 2013, was widely
thought to be the main beneﬁciary of T.S.S’s patronage, as he was also T.S.S’s son-in-
law.84 His record in winning elections was broken only in 2013, when he presented
himself for the ﬁrst gubernatorial contest for the newly-created oﬃce of County Governor,
and lost to Issa Timamy, a newcomer to Lamu politics (but by no means without social
status) who won with a slight margin of 1,959 votes.85
One of Timamy’s ﬁrst decisions while in oﬃce was to disband the LAPSSET Steering
Committee, a body that was created in 2012 by local leaders and LAPSSET oﬃcials,
and which was meant to involve Lamu residents in LAPSSET’s decision-making
process.86 The committee had received oﬃcial recognition, and according to a member,
was behind the proposal for 1,000 government scholarships for students from Lamu so
as to prepare them to take up job opportunities at the port. As explained by one of its
members, the committee was dissolved due to political diﬀerences between Fahim
Twaha and Issa Timamy:
When the governor [Issa Timamy] came in, he disbanded the committee. It was politics,
because most of the members had been Twaha’s campaigners… […] So Timamy and
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other elected leaders went to Kasuku [LAPSSET Chief Executive Oﬃcer] and said that
because they were elected, they had more power than the committee. So, they disbanded
the committee.87
Important to note, is that Timamy’s ﬁrst tenure in oﬃce was not only complicated by a
series of legal cases, as his detractors challenged his 2013 electoral victory in court, but
was also marked by competing factional interests – as various groups attempted, with
varying degrees of success, to retain control of some nominal structures of the county gov-
ernment.88 In addition to this, were a range of diverse and competing claims on land and
resources, around which questions of identity and belonging, and of the future of
LAPSSET in Lamu, were debated.89 In this debate, particular emphasis was placed on
the establishment of settlement schemes on the mainland areas of Lamu, especially
since the 1990s, where 59,084 more acres of land (in addition to the 35,120 acres that
were issued at the Lake Kenyatta Settlement Scheme Phase 1 in the 1970s) were allocated
to 2,991 households, compared to only 15,746 acres that were allocated to 4,123 house-
holds on the Bajuni dominated islands.90
The fact that a majority of the beneﬁciaries were Kikuyu had entrenched local Bajuni per-
ceptions of exclusion, and further engendered autochthonous discourses of belonging.91 In
addition, since most of the allocations were made under the tenure of Fahim Twaha (when
he was MP for LamuWest which covers the mainland areas), local perceptions from as early
as 2002 was that Twaha was a promoter of the interests of recently settled residents of Lamu
at the expense of the Bajuni.92 In fact, to win the votes of the increasing Kikuyu population
on the mainland, Twaha had tapped into a widely established discourse of ethnicity and pol-
itical party in Kenya, and successfully sought the nomination of parties – during the 2007,
2013 and 2017 elections – that had a major following amongst Kikuyus elsewhere in the
country. Therefore, in addition to the perception that Timamy was edging out the networks
that had revolved around Fahim Twaha and the former Lamu county council, his self-cul-
tivated public image as a defender of public land in Lamu was from 2013 to 2017 interpreted
as part of his responsiveness to increasing Bajuni discontent regarding migration and settle-
ment into Lamu by people from other parts of Kenya.93
Firstly, Timamy’s administration placed attention on irregular land allocations. A good
example are the investigations of irregular allocations of sand dunes, or water-catchment
areas, located on the southern parts of Lamu island, which Timamy had initiated during
his previous position as the Chairperson of the National Museums of Kenya.94 In 2013,
Timamy invited the NLC to take up the investigation, and by February 2017, the NLC
was threatening the revocation of over 117 title deeds issued for land in the area.95 The
names of the individuals that had been allocated deeds to the sand dunes were published
by the NLC, and it included people who had served in the defunct Lamu county council,
local bureaucrats and politicians, including Fahim Twaha, T.S.S, and Omar Twalib, a co-
founder of the Amu Ranch Conservancy and Twaha’s immediate predecessor in the Lamu
West parliamentary seat.96
Secondly, Timamy sought greater political control of the LAPSSET agenda. For
instance, Timamy’s county administration approved the allocation of 11,100 acres of
public land at Kiongwe village on the mainland to an American energy company, Cordi-
sons Limited – for the establishment of a wind-power generating project – without con-
sulting the NLC, which is legally mandated to allocate public land.97 After the NLC issued
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a separate lease for 3,206 acres of land to another company in the same area for a similar
project, Cordisons, supported by Timamy’s administration, sued the NLC, but lost the
case.98 Despite this, Timamy’s tussle with the NLC continued, and in early 2016, he
rejected the NLC’s allocation of 28,000 acres of land in Lamu for LAPSSET, accusing
the NLC of failing to consult his county administration while making the allocation.99
Adding to the chagrin of the NLC, Timamy went ahead to involve his county adminis-
tration in matters of land compensation for people occupying land earmarked for
LAPSSET activities.100 The resulting fragmentation of authority, associated with compet-
ing multiple interests, not only led to the creation of three diﬀerent lists of names of project
aﬀected persons (before a ﬁnal list was agreed upon), but created opportunities for indi-
viduals and groups that aligned themselves to beneﬁt from the anticipated monetary com-
pensation for the land.101
Meanwhile, Timamy’s struggles with the national government regarding the fate of
LAPSSET in Lamu was generating considerable local hostility against his county adminis-
tration, especially amongst those individuals and groups that had long beneﬁted from the
networks that Timamy had edged out of the instruments of local governance since 2013.
On one level, there existed claims that his county government was excluding Lamu’s resi-
dents on the mainland areas, and on another, that his actions were causing delays to projects
that required land, and hence, would meet popular expectations for monetary compensation
for land that was occupied, but would be required for the projects.102 Claims of local exclu-
sion, especially of non-Bajuni interests, and failures to meet popular expectations regarding
LAPSSET, constituted the central discursive thread within local politics on the run-up to the
2017 general-elections. Twaha, who would win the gubernatorial elections with a narrow
margin of 547 votes, stated during his campaigns:
The governor [Timamy] has been favouring some areas of the county. People in Mpeketoni
[mainland] are left out. He has also failed to unite the Lamu people. People are seeing each
other as Kikuyus, Bajunis… instead of Kenyans living in one county.103
Timamy denied these allegations, but his brief police arrest in July 2014 (after the June-
July Al-Shabaab attacks), which was largely the result of testimony issued by residents
on the mainland areas, revealed what local actors who felt alienated by Timamy’s
county administration were willing to do so as to regain local control and inﬂuence,
and with this, secure a place within LAPSSET’s promised future.104 The extent of the
divide between the population resident in the mainland and the islands, which closely
aligned with the multiple perceptions of LAPSSET in Lamu, was exempliﬁed by the elec-
toral results of the 2017 gubernatorial elections. While Fahim Twaha was declared winner,
Timamy won 63% of the votes in the predominantly Bajuni Lamu East constituency, and
Twaha received 53% of votes in the Kikuyu-dominated Lamu West.105
This division of interests – between those who are seen as ‘guests’ in Lamu, and those
who consider themselves as ‘hosts’ – was further demonstrated by the fact that Timamy
won in all the electoral wards of Lamu West where the Bajunis are the majority, and
lost in all the wards dominated by the Kikuyu.106 For instance, in the mainland electoral
ward of Hongwe where the Kikuyu form a distinctive majority, Timamy received a paltry
422 votes (or 13% of votes cast), while Twaha got 2,649 votes (or 81% of votes cast). As
such, the 2017 elections provided a ﬁeld upon which diverse actors and interests competed
for space, power and inﬂuence in Lamu, which would then determine who gets what, when
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and how, questions that were ampliﬁed with the economies of anticipation that were being
generated by LAPSSET’s promised future.
Conclusion
Economies of anticipation, as shown in this article, underscore the complex nature of
responses ‘frombelow’ that arisewhen capital (and the state) are extended into rural andmar-
ginal areas.107 Yet much of the literature emphasises the domination, expulsion or resistance
of ‘local communities’ that results from rural development programmes or large-scale infra-
structural projects.108 This article, however, has shown how, when such projects ‘hit the
ground’ they can interact in complex ways with social groups within the local state and
society, in ways ‘that are diﬀerentiated along class, gender, generation, ethnicity and nation-
ality, and that have historically speciﬁc expectations, aspirations and traditions of struggle.’109
In addressing a wider literature on large-scale development and land-based investments
in the ‘Global South’, the article, therefore, submits that dispossession, state domination
and local resistance are common outcomes, but adds that in contexts where investments
are yet to happen, and where an epistemic rift between the cultural repertoires of the
state and/or bearers of capital and local communities does not exist, the outcome is
much more complex and varied. Focussing on Lamu, the article has shown how these
local dynamics produce diverse responses involving multiple actors, with diﬀerent
consequences.
Drawing from recent investigations of the actual operation of state power and capital
on the ground, the article shows how, in some cases, opportunities are availed to hitherto
excluded actors, amidst concerns of potential exclusion. In sum, acknowledging that local
communities are more often than not made up of a diverse range of social actors, reveals –
and helps to explain – the complex economies of anticipation around a promised prosper-
ous future. The latter – it was argued – will determine the future distribution of economic,
agricultural, and other resources along the corridor, inﬂuencing who will be included or
excluded from the beneﬁts that LAPSSET promises.
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